Sir Nigel Gresley - The L.N.E.R.’s First C.M.E.

As I understand it, the middle big-end unreliability was caused by two quite separate factors in combination; non-optimal design of the big-end itself and excessive power from the middle cylinder under some conditions, which in turn was caused by the performance of the conjugated valve gear. Lining down the cylinder was a very simple modification to reduce the excess power and thus a reasonable way to alleviate the problem. It was far from a perfect solution but I wouldn't regard it as a bodge, and it might have some merit even with the improved big-end design.

Edit: it would be better to say that the big-end design was the cause of the problem but the excessive power from the middle cylinder exacerbated it.

Did you mean no less than?

 

Fair comment, but presumably Gresley (in this real universe) did intend the two V4s as the prototypes for a class of a fair size. So they are an important part of the Gresley story, and perhaps more significant than those very big beasties that (like the LMS equivalent) never made it at all.

 

Based on Cecil J. Allen's book, as I understand it the £50000 to Geddes was paid by the NER as what we would now probably call severance pay, a huge sum for those days, half a fortune in fact. But it was attached to an agreement that Geddes would not return to the NER, and when Geddes was canvassed for a possible position on the LNER the NER board considered themselves bound by this agreement and opposed his candidacy.

 

With all due respect I don't thing you get the point of a "what if" discussion. It's just harmless supposition and a bit of fun discussing what might have been. IIRC Stanier had a 4-6-4 on the drawing board and Gresley had a Super A4 and a 4-8-2 sketched out - not read of the 4-8-4 but every day's a school day. A nice bit of daydreaming regarding those beasts having come to fruition. Modellers of course can build these fantasies but those of us less gifted can but chat about it and dream.

 

Isn't it possible that the Board would have said ' You're 65 Sir Nigel, that's the retirement age.' ? After all, that's what happened to Thompson five years later.

 

Who knows? One of a number of possibilities I suppose. Robinson was still in harness at the GCR aged 67 though and he got offered the LNER job.

 

We do know, however, what happened when the board were confronted with the issues of wartime availability and maintenance, and the strategic decisions that followed - decisions that were within the mainstream of British locomotive practice, as Gresley increasingly was not.

My own hunch is that Gresley's death averted major and difficult rows within the LNER. Pace @30567, we don't know whether he'd have been made to retire or allowed to continue; as a "star", I think it likely that he would have been allowed to continue - and that such a decision would have been bad for all concerned, at the time and subsequently. Knowing when to go is an important part of the leader's art, and those who stay too long rarely come out well.

This thread has personalised matters in terms of discussion of Gresley and Thompson. That's inevitable, but I think obscures a different and important question. Gresley was an exponent of a bespoke form of locomotive engineering, building locomotives tailored to specific duties. In the inter-war period, that was being superseded by a tendency towards more generalist locomotives - a trend that the B1s fall squarely within, and which the BR Standards then followed. My hunch (and no more) is that the issues addressed in the Cox report, and where Thompson had to respond to the challenges of wartime, were ones that Gresley would have found more difficult to respond to, because they required a different perspective to the one that had served him and the GNR and later LNER well for many years.

 

Any counter-factual is a matter of judgement, but given than A3s, V2s and A4s all survived very late into steam suggests the Gresley approach wasn't completely wrong. If Cox did improve the big end issue, then it was clearly solvable, so query if the LNER could have solved it.

As for Gresley saying 3cyls only, was that before or after eg the J50? (Last built 1939)

It's also worth pointing out that had nationalisation not happened, if Gresley was still alive and in harness, you'd have a very different complexion to "common railway practice".

What happens if you get a V4, put a cox big end on it and ve out the expensive bits?

 

I am not sure this is true - I would not describe GNR era Gresley as an exponent of bespoke locomotive engineering. But you could say that he is someone who once was innovative who has got a bit stuck in their ways.

The thing that strikes me is that the next generation of designers - Fairburn, Ivatt, Riddles, Thompson, Peppercorn, Bulleid (and to an extent Hawksworth) all approached design from the point of view of reducing labour costs as a starting point, and yet their ideas appear radical compared to the designs of the mid-to late 1930s. Slightly different solutions but clearly all thinking along the same lines.

A Thompson loco looks radical sat next to a Gresley design, but no more radical than an Ivatt 4mt does next to a 4F or a Q1 next to a Q.

And yet, none of direction of design was picked up by Collett, Gresley etc in the second half of the 1930s (I'd argue that labour issues were already growing pre-1939). It takes a change of CME to kick design on. We often think of Collett and the GWR as being 'stuck in their ways' could the same not be said about Gresley?

Now, the question is whether Gresley could have adjusted to the new circumstances where labour more than fuel is the imperative that shapes designs. It is, however, hard to look at the V4 and say 'yes this is the loco for a wartime and post war railway where labour is in short supply'.

Could Gresley have changed his approach to loco design and building for a third time at age 65? Gresley at 50 might have been able to tack with the wind, but I am not sure he could have at 65.

 

On counter factuals: they can be interesting, but you have to consider the some of the change proposed with the scale of what you are discussing.

So - "what if Gresley hadn't died in 1941?" That's a plausible thing to have happened, and quite interesting to consider what LNER loco policy would have been, how he would have responded to labour shortages and declining availability etc.

But - "what if World War 2 hadn't happened?" Well, I think at that point there is rather more to consider than whether the LNER would have built any more V4s! That is such a fundamental change that considering a niche topic (against the scale of the global changes wrought by war) is basically unknowable.

Tom

 

To a degree, but one can consider how previous trends might have played out had the world continued on the previous track. And in that context, would there have been more V4s vs. would there have been B1s becomes a much more interesting question about engineering philosophy and design, because you have to start looking at why Gresley, Thompson, et al did what they did, and how those philosophies might have played out.

 

My suggestion might be that when you try to imagine counter factual history that you end up with many underlying factors pushing things along so they play out in the way they actually did, EG Germany winning WW2 is almost inconceivable when you look at the resources they had avalible.

But looking at how tings were going, unless you presuppose no Great Depression, WW2 or not the LNER was up the creek financially and the V4 wasn't what was needed, what was needed was the B1. (Or B12's in the early 20's)

 

All true, but looking at things from an outside slant can be a useful means of bringing into clear focus those variables which do actually inform decision making, many of which are easily taken for granted, when looking back from a 'done deal' perspective.

 

The fact being overlooked is that the V4s were built as prototypes hence it is unknown what changes Gresley may have made for the production series - even to the extent of considering a 2-cylinder variant. The question of staff concerns could be answered by noting the capacious and comfortable cabs provided for his train crews compared to the basic provision of other designers. Irrespective of what was designed one should remember that familiarity breeds consistency breeds performance by rail staff - especially on the maintenance side. One doubts that GWR crews familiar with inside motion would look at outside motion in the same way and LNER maintenance staff would surely abhor the maintenance of inside motion. Maintenance staff I knew in the 1960s accepted the conjugated motion and adopted their own methods of maintenance - some often different from those recommended by the locomotive's designer - but staff on the ground would quickly identify how to maintain and operate the locos for the specific duties which they covered at the individual depots.

 

Unlikely, as then I believe the state pension retirement age was 70. Also senior employees would have company pension provision, that almost certainly had no defined retirement age, and no need of the state pension.

 

Thompson was retired at 65(?) though and didnt several senior railway officials retire during WW2

 

Retiring at an older age was more common in earlier years (assuming you survived). As an example, Dugald Drummond on the LSWR died "in harness" aged 72 (nearly 73). His successor, Urie, was 68 when grouping took away his role; he might otherwise have expected to continue, I suspect.

Stanier was a month older than Gresley (both born in 1876), and lasted until 1944. Collett was five years older than both of them and lasted until 1941, aged 70. Maunsell was 3 years older than Collett (born 1868) and lasted until 1937, aged 69.

So, in the counter-factual that Gresley had been in better health, my hunch is that it is probably reasonable to expect he may have had a few more years in the role. Going on until he was about 68 - 70 would not have been abnormal, i.e. 1944 - 46 sort of timeframe.

Tom

 

The UK state pension age was reduced to 65 in 1925, but my understanding is that it remained means-tested until 1948, so payable only to those with lower incomes. Senior staff would have relied prior to 1948 on their own savings and private pensions plus company pensions.

https://www.pensionsarchive.org.uk/76/

 

Theres a bit on Railway Pensions

https://www.pensionsarchive.org.uk/historyofrailwaypensions