WCRC Licence Suspended

Thanks for that. I can well imagine the system would need to be overridden in certain circumstances. If doing so in the wrong circumstances led to an accident, I guess it's one of those things you have to accept in a situation where 100% safety can never be guaranteed.

 

Yes, I'm sure no such agenda exists. I suppose in the current situation, it is easy to be a little over sensitive and exaggerate the significance of some events in one's head.

 

The Railway industry is no different from any other industry. In general terms, organisations are rarely scrutinised by outside and there is a general reliance on them obeying rules, regulations, codes of practice and guidance. It largely works and it is only when things go wrong that the 'police' in the name of a HSE Inspector, or similar enforcing authority will come in and take an in-depth look at systems of work and whether the basic laws are being complied with. What is happening with WCRC is no different, nor should it be.

 

I think ORR are the organisation to watch not NR.

 

The SMS should be adequate and suitable for the services operated. I understand what you are saying and you are basically correct but I am not sure that it is the structure that can be simpler as such, but rather the scale of the task that structure has to deliver! This may allow a simpler structure but the basics of what it needs to provide remain the same but more limited. We don't need to worry about working under overhead wires or with 3rd rail electrification, for example!

Steven

 

I rather think that's the point. The WCRC case illustrates why a trust based regime is not appropriate in all circumstances. The lack of routine independent inspection will only ever lead to one outcome if all operators are treated the same regardless of their business model.
A reactive system such as the one you describe is not common. Most industries in high risk sectors are subject to objective third party inspection based on their likelihood of compliance. I am frankly amazed if TOCs exist without scrutiny unless or until they have an obvious transgression. If so its small wonder we have the current predicament .

 

Eh? If the equipment is isolated in the wrong circumstances and an accident occurs then that might be evidence of criminal negligence. It isn't a situation where we shrug our shoulders and say "ah well".

If TPWS needs to be isolated the rulebook requires the train to be brought to a stand and the signaller contacted. The train may continue only as far as is required to take it out of service or attach something with working TPWS. I am not speculating about what went on on the footplate, but the TPWS had been isolated and the train had not stopped and rung in to tell the signaller.

 

The problem (that ROGS tried to address) was that where the regulator (ORR)has too much oversight it gets to the point where it ends up assuming some part or all of the responsibilities that ought to be owned by the company. The ORR does carry out inspections, and they are based on a risk assessment, but they are not responsible. ROGS may not strike the right balance, and it is particularly difficult to implement well if you are a small organisation without the resources available to a NR, LUL or DBS for example.

 

"Open Access" doesn't mean "access for all types of rolling stock". Individual types of stock must be accepted as suitable to operate in each country even in mainland Europe and this takes a lot of time, effort and money. On a number of occasions, new stock has been bought for cross border operations (which usually involves working with differing safety systems - the local version of AWS, in effect - and different voltages of electrification) but the operator decides it isn't worth the hassle of going through more than one country's stock acceptance processes.

The "acceptance" process in the UK may involve quite a lot of "grandfather rights", meeting or gaining exemption from Railway Group Standards and stock being signed off as fit for purpose by a rolling stock verification body. Each operator must then list what equipment they intend to use - "having something on the Safety Case" - and show how they will operate that stock in the necessary detail.

If a particular type of stock is providing particular issues to the running of the network, Network Rail can suspend or restrict its use under the Track Access Contract until those issues are dealt with. That is the process which Network Rail would use in case of issues with steam and it would depend on the issues as to whether it was all steam or just a particular class. I am sure restrictions on the load taken without assistance would fall into this category. In effect, this is how "steam bans" are dealt with.

I think your second paragraph makes some hugely relevant points which in particular will affect the timing of a resolution.

Steven

 

Both Network Rail and the ORR undertaken periodic audits on a risk based approached. The Network Rail suspension notice refers to a review of WCRC which Network Rail had undertaken in January 2015. Throughout the rail industry, customer audit suppliers systems before placing contracts to ensure that use of that contractor won't import risk into the customer's operations.

21B's post is spot on and explains the difficult dilemma any regulator faces these days between being too hands on and hence risking some legal liability or seeming too un-involved and faces calls as to why they "didn't do more".

Steven

 

If a risk based inspection regime exists its hard to see how WCRC reached the position they have. Perhaps the assessment model is flawed and failed to identify them as requiring more frequent scrutiny because of the factors unique to them you cite.

 

No risk of repetition of what?

 

I think that is what NR & ORR are wondering.

 

One or other of them will know because it'll be their duty, surely?
Either they've arranged audits or the TOC supplies evidence of self assessment. Either way its not had a satisfactory outcome on this occasion.

 

There is no "if" about it, the regime exists, and the assessment model (ROGS) does have flaws. However, achieving the right level of oversight that does not stray into responsibility being passed to the regulator is difficult. The assumption is that the railway company has the systems and expertise in place to carry out their job diligently. Picking up the fact that they are not has always been very difficult. There was criticism of the ORR after the DCR incident at Stafford, I am sure they will be keen to avoid a repeat. However, it cannot be correct to say that the operators of the inspection regime are at fault for the failures (if so they be) of WCRC. IF there are systemic issues at WCRC that make it unable to live up to its duties under its Safety Certificate, then those issues are WCRC's responsibility alone. One cannot blame the ORR for them. Also, it is the way of the world to need a "big" incident to take action. If the ORR or NR had taken the course of action that they are now following prior to Wootten Basset we would all have been outraged by their heavy handedness. Fortunately Wootten was a near miss, they are doing their jobs to take action now.

 

And if and when the matter is decided, there may be an appeal by whichever side is aggrieved, taking the process to be even longer.

 

Sorry, I may not have made myself clear. I wasn't suggesting it wouldn't matter if the equipment was isolated in the wrong circumstances, or that serious consequences shouldn't follow. My point is that if the system has to be capable of being overridden, and it seems like it does, then we have to accept that it COULD be isolated in the wrong circumstances, but that unfortunately, this is unavoidable.

 

A mate of mine worked for NR and said steam accounted for a tiny proportion of the total of delay minutes in a year.

 

Don't subscribe to the argument at all that oversight means responsibility for action defaults to the regulator as the norm.
Impartial third party assessment is routine in many industries where there are regulatory requirements to be met. Can't really see why rail should be any different. Anything less is a bit like believing that foxes have a sincere desire to help extend the life expectancy of poultry.
However I do have sympathy if a lack of regulatory resources harms the effectiveness of the system. The light touch that appears to have been applied to WCRC must mean by extension other TOCs get even less attention, presuming WCRC has been in the highest risk category because of the business model and recent history.